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Timing and Delegation:
A Reply
JonathanR. Siegel*
For two authors who come to such different conclusions, Professor Manning and I agree on a good deal. We agree that courts, in
considering whether to consult legislative history in the course of
statutory construction, must take heed of the special constitutional
rule against congressional self-aggrandizement.' Thus, we agree
that the Constitution forbids courts to give authoritative weight to
post-enactment legislative history, 2 because the effect of such a ju-

dicial practice is to permit Congress to delegate a very important
power, the power to elaborate the meaning of statutes, to its committees or Members.3 We also agree, however, that Congress may,
by express statement in a statute, validate legislative materials
through incorporation by reference, thereby investing such materials with authority. 4 Indeed, inasmuch as we agree that Congress
might use such incorporation by reference in every statute it
passes, 5 I take it we agree that my hypothetical Interpretation of
Statutes Act 6 could function constitutionally if only Congress, in

*
Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. I would like to
thank Professor Manning for engaging in this colloquy. Thanks also to Chip Lupu for his comments on this reply.
1. See John F. Manning, Textualism as a NondelegationDoctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673,
675 (1997); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of SeparatedPowers,
53 VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1522-23 (2000).
2. In saying that courts should not treat such legislative history as "authoritative," both
Professor Manning and I mean that courts must not give such legislative history any weight by
virtue of its source. We agree, however, that courts are not forbidden to read legislative history,
even post-enactment legislative history; they are free to consider any persuasive argument about
the meaning of a statute. Such an argument, if made in post-enactment legislative materials,
does not have any less value than it would if made elsewhere (say, in a litiganes brief); it simply
should not receive any more weight either. See John F. Manning, PuttingLegislative History to a
Vote, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1529 n.2 (2000); Siegel, supranote 1, at 1476-77.
3. See Siegel, supranote 1, at 1522-24.
4. See Manning, supra note 2, at 1530 n.7, 1533; Siegel, supranote 1, at 1489-97.
5. See Manning, supra note 2, at 1534-35, 1541; Siegel, supra note 1, at 1495.
6. For the provisions of this hypothetical Act, see Siegel, supra note 1, at 1491, 1522.

1543

1544

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 53:5:1543

The sticking point, therefore, is only this: if Congress wants
to create a regime in which courts may attribute authority to legislative history, must it do so by including an express statement to
that effect in every statute, or may it pass one statute that makes
this the general rule? Professor Manning inclines to the former
view; I, to the latter. In this very brief reply, I have just a couple of
comments on this difference between us.
The root cause of our disagreement lies in our different understandings of the importance of timing in delegation doctrine.
Professor Manning acknowledges that the Supreme Court's cases
concerning congressional self-delegation all deal with delegation of
authority to take action after enactment of the authority-granting
statute, but he regards this point as a mere detail "that does not
relate to the reasoning of those cases." 7 I, on the other hand, believe
that there is a fundamental difference between a delegation of
power to act in the future and a delegation of power to act in the
past.8 Indeed, in my view, not only the established doctrine, but
logic and common sense, compel such a difference. The very concept
of a delegation is inherently forward-looking. It is hard to see how a
legislature could delegate power to act in the past, even if it wanted
to. If a legislature, knowing that another body has already taken a
certain action, tries to "delegate," to the other body, power to take
that very action (not to take a similar action again in the future,
but to take the action already taken), the grant of power operates
as an adoption or ratification of the action, not as a delegation.
That is the lesson of the incorporation by reference cases, which
make this point by holding, over and over again, that static incorporation by reference is always valid, not because it is a permitted
delegation, but because it is not q delegation at all. 9
The incorporation by reference cases establish that timing is
of fundamental importance to delegation doctrine. In light of these
cases it should be no surprise that the law should distinguish between permitting a statute's interpretation to be influenced by extrastatutory texts that existed before the statute's passage and
granting such influence to texts not written until afterwards. If
Congress, by statute, authorized a congressional committee to prepare materials later that would authoritatively elaborate the statute's meaning, it would indeed violate the rule against self-

7.

Manning, supra note 2, at 1536.

8.
9.

See Siegel, supranote 1, at 1492.
See Siegel, supranote 1, at 1480-89.
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delegation. By providing that passage of any statute would operate
as a ratification or incorporation of already-existingmaterials, however, my hypothetical Interpretation of Statutes Act would draw the
sting of Professor Manning's charge that the statute unconstitutionally "authorizes 'a congressional agent to set policy that binds
the nation.' "10 The agent would not be setting policy; Congress
would be voting to ratify the agent-prepared texts when passing
each statute." The Interpretation of Statutes Act would not "reallocat[e] lawmaking power from Congress to its legislative subunits,'1 2 because legislative adoption of extrinsic materials yields no
power from the legislature to the preparer of the materials-provided the materials are fixed before the legislative vote adopting
them. 13 1 rest my case on this crucial point.
Professor Manning attempts to defeat my arguments by relying on the purposes underlying the special rule against congressional self-aggrandizement. He suggest several times that a critical
problem with the Interpretation of Statutes Act is that it would
"separate[ ] responsibility from result."14 It would, he says, allow
courts to give weight to legislative materials even though rank-andfile legislators would not really be responsible for them. 15 In my respectful view, this argument contains two errors. It understates the
degree of responsibility that rank-and-file legislators would bear for
legislative history under my hypothetical Act, and it overstates the
degree of responsibility that the Constitution requires. In fact, legislators could not fully distance themselves from legislative history,
and such distancing as they could achieve would be constitutional.
As I suggested in my Article, if the Interpretation of Statutes
Act were in effect, a vote for any bill would be a vote for the bill's
legislative history, because the history would be deemed incorporated into the bill.16 A legislator who disclaimed responsibility for
the legislative history under such a regime would simply be lying
(or, more charitably, would be mistaken). This point addresses the
scenario that appears most troubling to Professor Manning, in
which a rank-and-file legislator votes for a bill while proclaiming

10. Manning, supra note 2, at 1536 (quoting Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens
for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 274 (1991) (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714, 758-59 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (internal quotation marks omit-

ted))).
11. See Siegel, supranote 1, at 1496-97.
12. Manning, supranote 2, at 1534.
13. See Siegel, supranote 1, at 1482, 1491-92.
14. Manning, supra note 2, at 1538; see also id. at 1530, 1534, 1535, 1540.
15. See id.
16. See Siegel, supranote 1, at 1506-07.
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disagreement with the bill's legislative history, and secretly relies
on the knowledge that courts will later treat the legislative reports
and sponsor's statements as more authoritative than a mere disclaimer from an ordinary legislator.17 In Manning's view, this scenario is unconstitutional because it allows Congress's vote to imbue
legislative history with authoritative force while permitting ordinary legislators to disclaim responsibility for the history. In my
view, each legislator necessarily votes for incorporated legislative
history, and the scenario is therefore no more troubling than one in
which a legislator votes for a bill while making an implausible
statement about the bill's meaning, and secretly relies on the
knowledge that a court interpreting the statute will give the statutory text priority over the legislator's remarks. 18 A legislator cannot
avoid responsibility for a vote simply by disclaiming it any more
than he can avoid responsibility by crossing his fingers while voting. The Interpretation of Statutes Act would ensure that each legislator would bear the constitutionally required degree of responsibility for legislative history.19
At the same time, it is certainly true that a legislator could
achieve some distance from legislative history by honestly relying
on the lesser status that legislative history has (and would have
even under my hypothetical Act) compared to statutory text. 20 Even
if the Interpretation of Statutes Act were in effect, a legislator who
agreed with a statute's text but believed that a legislative report
explained the text incorrectly could truthfully say, "I am necessarily voting for the whole package, but everyone should bear in mind
that the legislative history is just legislative history; under established judicial practices that the Interpretation of Statutes Act confirms, it will be consulted only if the statutory text is ambiguous
and even then it will receive less weight than the statutory text."

17. See Manning, supra note 2, at 1537.
18. See Siegel, supranote 1, at 1507-07.
19. Professor Manning lodges his criticisms against those parts of my Article that argue for
the constitutionality of my hypothetical Interpretation of Statutes Act; he does not specifically
address my discussion of the constitutionality of judicial use of legislative history in the real

world, in which the hypothetical Act has never been passed. Presumably, this is because, if
Professor Manning is right that my hypothetical Act is unconstitutional, it would follow a fortiori
that judicial use of legislative history in the real world is invalid. In this reply, I therefore devote
my attention primarily to the constitutionality of the hypothetical statute, but I do not mean to
withdraw from my suggestion that, even without passage of such a statute, an appropriate degree of legislative responsibility for legislative history can arise from a systemic understanding
that a vote for any statute ratifies the statute's legislative history and authorizes courts to give it
the force that legislative history customarily receives. See Siegel, supra note 2, at 1511-16.
20. See Siegel, supranote 1, at 1497-1505.
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The Interpretation of Statutes Act would permit this degree of distance to exist between legislators and legislative history.
Professor Manning claims that this degree of distance would
unconstitutionally relieve legislators of responsibility for legislative
history, 21 but in fact it would be no more than an honest recognition
of legislative history's status. This degree of distance already exists
between legislators and some kinds of statutory text. As I observed
in my Article, statutory text often contains different parts, some of
which (for example, a preamble or a statement of purposes) are less
definitive than others. 22 A legislator who agrees with a statute's
operative text while disagreeing with some of the implications that
might flow from its preamble may vote for the whole package while
pointing out that courts will not give the preamble the same weight
as the operative text. It might be said that such a legislator distances herself from, or does not take full responsibility for, the preamble; this distancing, however, is no more than an honest recognition of the status of this kind of statutory text. The Constitution
does not require that Congress enact only text for which legislators
are willing to take "full responsibility," if by "full responsibility" we
mean that they are willing to have courts give the text the full
weight given to operative statutory text. Passage of text with lesser
status, from which legislators may be said to be somewhat distanced, is allowed. 23 Only this same kind of distancing could be
achieved with regard to legislative history, and it should be no more
troubling there than it is with regard to distancing from a pream24
ble.

21. See Manning, supranote 2, at 1537.
22. See Siegel, supra note 1, at 1499-1500.
23. See id.; see also Manning, supranote 1, at 729-30.
24. A couple of minor points: in support of his assertion that the Interpretation of Statutes
Act is an unconstitutional structural command masquerading as a rule of statutory construction,

Professor Manning claims that the Act seems uncomfortably different from typical rules of statutory construction. Certainly it is somewhat different from the rules that he offers for comparison, such as those defining particular statutory terms. See Manning, supra note 2, at 1534.
However, I would suggest that the Act bears an appropriate resemblance to other rules of statutory construction, such as the rule that Congress is presumed to be aware of and to ratify existing administrative or judicial interpretations of statutory language that it re-enacts without
change. Like that rule, the Interpretation of Statutes Act provides that Congress is deemed to be
aware of and to ratify certain extrinsic materials when it enacts a statute. See Siegel, supra note
1, at 1513-16.
Manning also asserts that, in practice, Congress would probably want to incorporate legislative history only selectively. See Manning, supra note 2, at 1534-35. I am not sure that this
assertion is accurate. Manning notes that Congress only rarely incorporates legislative history
expressly; he mentions the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as such a rare example. See id. What really
happened in that Act, however, was that Congress took the rare step of expressly disavowing
legislative history. See Siegel, supra note 1, at 1495. One might equally well infer from the
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CONCLUSION

By creating a regime in which each statute is deemed to incorporate its legislative history, the Interpretation of Statutes Act
would take legislative history out of delegation doctrine altogether,
and it would ensure that Congress as a whole bears the constitutionally required degree of responsibility for legislative history.
Judged either by the formal requisites of the separation of powers
or by the underlying purposes of that doctrine, the Act would be
constitutional.

rarity of congressional action in this area that Congress is content with current judicial practices, under which most judges consider themselves free to consult all legislative history and to
give each part of it such weight as is, in their judgment, appropriate. Also, Congress might be
willing to incorporate all legislative history despite the less careful process by which it is generated, see Manning, supra note 2, at 1535, because of the lesser weight it receives.
In any event, whether or not Manning is correct on this point, congressional passage of the
Interpretation of Statutes Act would evince a desire to incorporate all legislative history (as
defined in § 3 of the Act) into every statute. The Act would not relieve legislators of the responsibility for choosing which legislative history to incorporate, see Manning, supra note 2, at 1541;
it would instruct them that, if they make no contrary statement, their vote for a statute will be a
vote to incorporate all of the statute's legislative history.

